
President Donald Trump speaks to supporters at a rally Saturday, Oct. 17, 2020, in Janesville. Angela Major/WPR
“At 9:37 a.m. Wednesday, the president was still bullish on his policy, posting on Truth Social: “THIS IS A GREAT TIME TO BUY!!!” “But in the end, it was the markets that got him to reverse course.”
And what brought it about, notwithstanding Trump’s assertion he knows what he’s doing:
“The economic turmoil, particularly a rapid rise in government bond yields, caused Mr. Trump to blink on Wednesday afternoon and pause his “reciprocal” tariffs for most countries for the next 90 days, according to four people with direct knowledge of the president’s decision.”
It is turmoil and it accompanies Trump as we’ve seen both in his first four years and now, I think, in a ramped up version in his second.
The behavior does not change. Now what is this all about? I think David Brooks, a contributor for the PBS NewsHour and an opinion columnist for the NYTimes pinpointed Trump’s underlying motivation and his behavior. As Brooks recently suggested in a piece in The Atlantic, titled, “I Should have Seen this Coming”:
“If there is an underlying philosophy driving Trump, it is this: Morality is for suckers.The strong do what they want and the weak suffer what they must. This is the logic of bullies everywhere. And if there is a consistent strategy, it is this: Day after day, the administration works to create a world where ruthless people can thrive. That means destroying any institution or arrangement that might check the strongman’s power. The rule of law, domestic or international, restrains power, so it must be eviscerated. Inspectors general, judge advocate general officers, oversight mechanisms, and watchdog agencies are a potential restraint on power, so they must be fired or neutered. The truth itself is a restraint on power, so it must be abandoned. Lying becomes the language of the state.”
“Trump’s first term was a precondition for his second. His first term gradually eroded norms and acclimatized America to a new sort of regime. This laid the groundwork for his second term, in which he’s making the globe a playground for gangsters.”
“We used to live in a world where ideologies clashed, but ideologies don’t seem to matter anymore. The strongman understanding of power is on the march. Power is like money: the more the better. Trump, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the rest of the world’s authoritarians are forming an axis of ruthlessness before our eyes. Trumpism has become a form of nihilism that is devouring everything in its path.”
An axis of ruthlessness. Wow! The impact on trade – with the tariff madness is all too apparent. But it is an attack as well on the alliances and partnerships in the global order that likely brings the most long term damage to the stability of the global order and these attacks have been ongoing since the first Trump administration.
This weakening to multilateralism is not just to be laid at the feet of President Trump, however. Some time ago Stewart Patrick, now of the Carnegie Endowment (CEIP) pointed out the faltering of multilateralism. As he wrote in the Oxford journal, Global Summitry, [ a reveal, I was editor at the time] in 2015, he cast back to Obama as he then was, a junior US Senator prior to his first term as President. Obama wrote in 2007 criticizing Bush at that time for the failure to promote greater multilateral action:
“This vision of a multilateral renaissance was premised on the conviction that a new global age had dawned. The core purpose of statecraft was no longer restraining geopolitical rivalry but managing shared dilemmas of interdependence.”
“This broad congruence of interest created unprecedented opportunities for cooperation. But success was not preordained. It required a new international bargain: established powers would grant emerging ones a place at the global head table, and rising powers would accept greater responsibilities for advancing the common good. The administration assumed the United States could engineer global institutional reform on this basis.”
“That confidence proved unfounded. The Obama years show just how resistant formal international organizations are to fundamental change. Two of the most obvious cases are the UN Security Council, whose permanent membership still reflects the world of 1945, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which has failed to implement governance reforms that members painstakingly negotiated in 2010. The sources of these logjams are legion. Three of the most important are clashing big power preferences, generic institutional inertia, and inconsistent U.S. leadership (Stein 2008).”
The weakening of multilateralism accelerated, it seems to me, with Trump, that erosion only slowed somewhat with the Biden years, but now seemingly has returned with a vengeance under Trump 2.0. As Ivo Daalder has pointed to in his recent piece on NATO in FA , titled, “NATO Without America: How Europe Can Run an Alliance Designed for U.S. Control”:
“Given Trump’s low regard for the alliance and its collective defense commitment, it would be no surprise if his administration decided to withdraw from NATO . In late 2023, Congress passed a law prohibiting the president from doing this without congressional assent—a bill that, ironically, was cosponsored by then Senator Marco Rubio, who is now Trump’s secretary of state.”
“Even if he doesn’t withdraw from the alliance, Trump has already seriously undermined it. NATO’s Article 5 collective-defense provision—which says that an attack on any alliance member will be considered an attack on all—derives its credibility less from the formal treaty than from a belief among the members that they are all prepared to come to one another’s defense. In practice, this has meant that the United States, with its vast military, would step up to protect any NATO ally that is attacked. Trump’s words and actions since retaking office—including his direct threats against Canada and Greenland, both of which are part of NATO—have eroded these assumptions.”
The challenge to NATO’s collective defence with Trump’s uncertainty toward collective action is evident. And many of what I call the Formals, the UN, in particular the UN Security Council and its specialized agencies, the International Financial Institutions, or IFIs, and more are hobbled by the rising geopolitical tensions – the US, Russia and China and the decline in willingness of these and more powers to collaborate.
Yet as noted above, the weakening in multilateral collaboration has been evident for some time. My colleague, Stewart, reflected on this, and noted the rise of informal institutions. As he then wrote:
“If one focuses solely on formal international organizations, these blockages are grounds for despair. But that pessimistic view obscures a more complicated and promising picture of multilateral cooperation. For what sets the current global era apart is not the absence of international institutions but their astonishing diversity. Faced with resistance to sweeping, transformational change within more encompassing global bodies, U.S. and foreign policy-makers have generated and then exploited a messier form of multilateralism (Haass 2010).”
“Formal organizations persist, but governments increasingly participate in a bewildering array of flexible networks whose membership varies based on situational interests, shared values, or relevant capabilities. States may continue to negotiate and collaborate within conventional bodies like the United Nations or the Bretton Woods institutions. But extensive policy coordination also occurs within parallel frameworks that are ad hoc and temporary rather than formal and permanent.”
And Stewart noted that another colleague, Miles Kahler had even earlier, much earlier, identified the emergence of what he referred to as ‘minilateralism’ in an article in International Organization ( IO) , titled : “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers” As Stewart wrote:
“These institutions are often “minilateral” (Kahler 1992) rather than universal; voluntary rather than legally binding; disaggregated rather than comprehensive; trans-governmental rather than just intergovernmental; regional rather than global; multi-level and multi-stakeholder rather than state-centric; and “bottom-up” rather than “top-down.””
And as I and others have noted, a number of what I call Informals have arisen since the 1970s. First there was the G7 and then in 1999 the G20 as a finance and central bank gathering becoming a G20 leaders-led annual gathering in 2008. Finally, there was the creation of the BRICs in 2006 – Brazil, Russia, India, China with a leader-led gathering in 2009 and the addition of South Africa in 2011. I mention these separately since these Informals are more institutionalized and far less ad hoc than many minilaterals. They are hybrids between the formal and the informal institutions.
The real question though is whether these leader-led informals can counter the destructive geopolitical tensions that now dominate global order relations? These tensions are brought home by the current difficulties between the G20 host, South Africa and the Trump administration. Two senior officials, namely Secretary of State Rubio and Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent have failed recently to join their first ministerial gatherings during South Africa hosting. And questions have arisen as to whether Trump will join the G20 leaders summit gathering this year in South Africa.
The question raised is: can this Informal work to advance the current global governance agenda, without the US? Or, in fact is this the only way possible for this key Informal to move forward. And, if it is the only way, will leaders minus the US be willing to press forward on critical global governance issues? Which then is the more fruitful path for global collaboration?
All of this is critical and bears close attention, now, and going forward. We will follow closely and report frequently.
Image Credit: WPR
This Post originally appeared at Alan’s Newsletter https://globalsummitryproject.substack.com/p/the-spiral-of-disorder-building-then-aed